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ABSTRACT: The classical Greek term pistis (trust) is presented as a relevant norm in the analysis of 
parliamentary debate. Through exploration of pistis apparent similarities to the term ethos have 
appeared. It is proposed that pistis can be viewed as the equivalent to ethos, concerning the common 
space or connection between the speaker and the audience. Tentatively "truth", "faith" and "respect" 
are proposed as the elements equivalent to phronesis, areté and eunoia. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Looking at virtues of argumentation, trust – or the rhetorical term: pistis – is an 
important factor and a kind of meta-norm, often established early in our training, 
but seldom discussed or applied in our daily work. I perceive pistis as a meta-norm, 
because it is prerequisite for there to be any point in arguing in the first place. 
 This line of thought can be traced back quite far and we find the point in a 
variety of texts, for example with 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid: 
 
It is evident, that, (…), the balance of human judgement is by nature inclined to the 
side of belief; ... If it was not so, no proposition that is uttered in discourse would be 
believed, until it was examined and tried by reason; and most men would be unable 
to find reasons for believing the thousandth part of what is told them. (Reid, 1769, p. 
423) 
 
Every time you thus choose a norm to navigate by, other norms are disregarded, as 
is always the case when making a normative analysis and critique. Besides being a 
prerequisite for argumentation, I find the norm to be especially relevant and 
interesting in relation to the material of my analysis: parliamentary debates. I found 
that pistis can be brought forward and be of practical use, especially in the 
strengthening of parliamentary debate as the common practice of our democratic 
rights. 
 Parliamentary debate is one of the pillars of a democratic society; this means 
openness about decision-making and that the arguments of the politicians and the 
reasons for the choices must be accessible to the public. 
 Following World War II Danish thinker Hal Koch worked on the themes of 




The nature of democracy is not decided by polls, but by dialogue, negotiation, 
mutual respect and understanding and the hence growing sense of a common good. 
(Koch, 1945, p. 23) 
 
And later he wrote: 
 
In a democratic society it is admitted, that all decisions are relative, only an 
approximation of what is right, and therefore the discussion of a subject does not 
cease. (Koch, 1945, p. 25) 
 
These quotes represent the perception of democracy with which I grew up and they 
also establish two important rhetorical points: that dialogue is the basic rhetorical 
situation and that decisions are ever only temporary, disagreement will exist, even 
after a sober and well-argued debate. And if democratic dialogue, as ideally 
expressed in parliamentary debate, is to succeed, I find pistis a very relevant and 
applicable norm. 
 Another reason to work critically with norms for parliamentary debates is 
that despite the fact that it has been a priority with the Danish Parliament to 
increase the accessibility and variety of the debates available to the public, the 
debates – and the politicians themselves – are regularly subject to open criticism. 
Hence, openness alone is not enough. And even though the debates have always 
been considered fundamental to democracy, surprisingly little research has been 
conducted concerning their functions and overall objective. 
 As we all know, neither the course or results of research are ever a given, so 
suffice it to say that this analysis has been both explorative and borne by a guiding 
hypothesis, namely that it would be possible to utilize the concept of pistis in a 




Former professor of Rhetorics at the University of Copenhagen, Jørgen Fafner, is one 
of only very few, who have touched upon the concept of pistis. In the article 
“Rhetorics and Cognition” he states: 
 
Pistis is in its broadest sense the cement of society, an emanation of the ethos of a 
single individual in human society. In this sense, pistis is something you possess. But 
it is also something that can be acquired and strengthened. It is remarkable, that 
pistis is a prerequisite in the speech (…) But this pistis can also be established 
through speech itself. (Fafner, 1999, p. 36) 
 
Fafner mentions pistis on several occasions and it is clear that he considers it a key 
concept in the study of rhetorics. In every mention of the term, he relates that it can 
be acquired and strengthened through rhetorical activity. I had a suspicion that the 
opposite must also be the case: that it could deteriorate or be compromised and 
hence arose the hypothesis, that it must also be possible to find concrete examples 
of exactly that in a rhetorical analysis. 
 But the above rather general observations regarding pistis are nowhere near 
a solid tool for analysis of rhetorical artefacts. So I wished to examine and enhance 
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the understanding of the concept of pistis by exploring the approaches to “trust” in 
other fields of study. 
 
2.1 Pistis in antiquity 
 
As pistis is a term coined in ancient Greek rhetorical practice, a natural point of 
departure was to examine the original meaning of the concept. Consulting Liddell & 
Scott’s “A Greek-English Lexicon” the meaning is first: “trust (in others), faith or 
belief” and second: “that, which provides such faith, either assurances, warrants or 
arguments, proof or persuasion”. In the translation from ancient Greek to Latin this 
dual meaning becomes even clearer, as pistis is divided into two separate words; it 
translates into either argumentum or fides. The term itself holds a duality, in that it 
encompasses both the effect and the reason (cause): both the state of having faith or 
trusting, and the very things that create said trust. 
 
2.2 Pistis as trust 
 
Another obvious place to look for thoughts on trust is in philosophy. The concept is 
widely discussed in this field, with arguments both for and against trust as a basic 
human condition, but I will leave that discussion to the philosophers and here only 
mention a few specific quotes, arguing the case for trust. 
 The 18th century philosopher Thomas Reid states, that human beings have en 
inherent or natural urge to speak the truth and a faith that their fellow human 
beings do too. Reid names these principles “the principle of veracity” and “the 
principle of credulity” (Reid, 1769, p. 419) and state that these are absolutely 
necessary for there to be any communication at all: 
 
This is, in reality, a kind of prescience of human actions; and it seems to me to be an 
original principle of the human constitution, without which we should be incapable 
of language... (Reid, 1769, p. 423) 
 
Another to argue for trust as a basic factor in our lives and societies is Danish 
theologist and philosopher K.E. Løgstrup, who touches upon the concept of trust in a 
number of places, for example: 
 
Trust in its most elementary sense is an inherent element of any conversation. By 
conversing at all, you lay yourself open to the other, manifesting by the mere fact of 
having opened the conversation, that you lay a claim to the other person. (Løgstrup, 
1956, p. 24) 
 
With a basic democratic aspect and a rhetorical point of view concerning the 
conversation as a basic rhetorical situation, I also found it relevant to address the 
field of deliberative democracy. It is an extended and widespread field, with its roots 
in a philosophical and theoretical approach, but later increasingly emphasizing the 
practical aspects. The discussions of definitions etc. within the field continue, but in 




They describe a basic sentiment of “reciprocity” (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2000), which among other things entails that debaters owe each other mutual 
respect. This respect is shown by accepting the duty to substantiate one’s views 
with arguments, by taking the views of the opponent seriously and by 
acknowledging the existence of “reasonable disagreement”, in the sense that there 
will be disagreement, even after an otherwise successful debate. This also entails a 
duty to practice “economy of moral disagreement”.  
 Especially where ”reasonable disagreement” and ”economy of moral 
disagreement” is concerned, Gutmann & Thompson seem inspired by the court 
philosopher John Rawls, who also worked with the concepts of democracy and 
deliberation. According to Rawls, the purpose of political discussion is to reach 
“reasonable agreements” and the discussions must to the best of everyone’s ability 
be conducted in such a manner, as to best achieve this result. 
 These principles entail a number of consequences. Firstly, you must be 
careful of accusing your opponent of looking out for their own or group interests, of 
being prejudiced or blinded by ideology, because these accusations lead to 
resentment and hostility, and will hence block the way to “reasonable agreements”. 
Secondly, you must acknowledge the existence of “reasonable disagreement”, 
especially on matters of high importance, even after the debates. Lastly, Rawls 
states: 
 
(…) when we are reasonable, we are ready to enter discussion crediting others with 
a certain good faith. (Rawls, 1989, p. 238) 
 
Another relevant contributor to the discussion is professor of political science John 
Dryzek, arguing that democracy must hold a deliberative aspect, and that in public 
deliberation you must appeal to common values, interests and the common good, as 
in justice, fairness, the defence of your country or economic stability etc. (Dryzek, 
2000) and Dryzek & List, 2003) It would be detrimental to your credibility, if your 
arguments were too one-sidedly based on mere group interests. 
In Danish political science hardly anyone has worked with the actual debates 
in the Danish Parliament “Folketinget”, but I did manage to find one relevant study 
(T. K. Jensen, 1993). It showed that Danish politicians spend considerable amounts 
of time on dialogue and networks and concludes that work in the Danish Parliament 
is highly oral by nature (T. K. Jensen, 1993, p. 281). This for two reasons: the speed 
of oral communication and the credibility attached. And trust is the factor that binds 
the two together, making everyday political work flow smoothly. 
 
2.3 Pistis as argumentum 
 
If you wish to utilize pistis as a tool for analysis, it is necessary to address the “other” 
meaning of the word: pistis as argumentum. Materials abound, but I have chosen the 
article “Sensible Disagreement” by professor Kock to represent this angle (Kock, 
2008). 
 The main thesis of the article maintains that debate is important for the sake 
of the audience, for them to form a reasonable impression of the debated matter 
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and, afterwards, in a deliberate, well-grounded manner, may form their own opinion 
of the case at hand. And as it is in the role as part of an audience, Kock maintains, 
that most citizens will realistically find themselves, it renders it even more 
important for the debates to hold such a quality, as to assist the audience in the 
formation of their individual opinions. 
 Through a minute, comparative examination of – amongst others – Rawls, the 
antique studies on stasis and informal logic, Kock finds a high degree of consistency 
in the ways of assessing argumentation. Three elements prevail in the assessments: 
acceptability, relevance and “good grounds”, the last pertaining to the quality of the 
actual grounds given for a certain argument. And by including also 
incommensurability and pluralism of values he arrives at the following conclusion: 
 
The basic situation is, in any case, that there may be relevant, acceptable arguments 
on both sides; these cannot be measured by any common, objective scale; but the 
individual will still need to compare arguments for and against the matter at hand. 
(Kock, 2008, p. 75) 
 
This becomes the reason why we as citizens need political debate, to help us assess 
and clarify our own stance in the matter discussed and this requires of the debaters 
involved: 
 
The voter above all needs: 1) that arguments are explicit, both for the debaters’ own 
views and in the critique of the arguments of their opponents, and 2) that debaters 
both acknowledge and address the relevant arguments of the opponent. (Kock, 
2008, p. 76) 
 
2.4 Pistis as the ethos of the community 
 
Working through all these areas it became increasing clear to me, that I sense a 
certain affinity between ethos and pistis, as Fafner touched upon in the 
aforementioned quote. Ethos is established between the speaker and the audience, 
but is still largely tied to the speaker, her skills and relation to the audience.  
 It is my belief, that pistis in a similar way arises in the relation between a 
speaker and an audience, but the relation is not merely between an individual 
speaker and a specific audience, but to the community or common space, which 
exists between the speaker and the audience. And since we have established that 
pistis can be constructed or deteriorate through rhetorical activity – as is the case 
with ethos – it would for instance be possible to find an initial, derived and terminal 
pistis like we do with ethos (McCroskey, 2001, pp. 83-102). 
 If ethos and pistis are indeed related in such a manner, the next question 
would naturally be: “What elements of pistis correspond to the three elements of 
ethos: phronesis, arete and eunoia?” I am very well aware that I am now navigating in 
uncharted waters, but tentatively I propose “truth”, “faith” and “respect”. “Truth” 
here understood in a rhetorical sense, namely the absence of lies and willful 
distortion of fact; “faith” here meaning the expectation that the opponent is (also) 
participating in the dialogue or debate with the aim of reaching the best possible 
solutions for the common good; and mutual “respect” as an indispensable element, if 
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general trust is to be maintained. 
 
2.5 Pistis as a tool for analysis 
 
The division into three elements renders the concept far more useful as a tool for 
concrete analysis, enabling us to look for places, where “truth”, “faith” and “respect” 
are constructed or diminished. To this end, I’ve chosen to elaborate on the division 
in a schematic form, based on the observations I’ve made in the aforementioned 
sources. I’ve chosen to group the various statements into the three categories 
(“truth”, “faith” and “respect”), from an intuitive sense of where they belonged. 
Certain statements appear more than once, for example under both “truth” and 
“faith”. The form (table 1) served as my frame of reference throughout the analysis 
of the debates. 
 
 




Truth Faith Respect 
Absence of lies No references to private 
conversations 
Adhering to agreements 
Absence of willful distortion 
of fact 
Abstaining from criticizing the 
opponent 
Respecting your 
opponent/The fact that we 
owe each other due respect  
Tactics are allowed The process of decision-
making must be clear 
Taking into consideration 
peer interests 
A clear process of decision-
making 
Acknowledging the 
arguments of the opponent  
No references to private 
conversations 
A nuanced presentation of the 
case  
Argumentation Acknowledging the 
arguments of the opponent 
Argumentation  The natural propensity to 
believe your opponent 
Economy of moral 
disagreement 
Relevance, acceptability and 
”good grounds” 
To understand the words in 
the sense that they are spoken 
 
That arguments are explicit, 
both for the debaters’ own 
views and in the critique of 
the arguments of their 
opponents 
It is generally negative to be 
wary of one another  
 
The natural urge to speak the 
truth  
Avoiding accusations of self- 
or group-interests, prejudice 
or ideological blindness  
 
Mutually acceptable and 
generally accessible grounds 
Acknowledging the existence 
of reasonable disagreement 
 
 Acknowledging and accepting 
that disagreement exists and 
acknowledging the fair 




3. THE ANALYSIS 
 
The material for my analysis I defined as debates of law proposals presented by the 
government and subsequently passed, concerning topics relevant in the everyday 
lives of the citizens and/or of high political interest. These topics were integration, 
traffic, environment, health, culture, social services, legal affairs and one debate on 
an ethical matter and were chosen for the immediate consequences on the lives of 
the citizens and hence the assumed interest, that would (or should) be placed on the 
corresponding debates. 
 The Danish Parliament is unicameral, and formally three debates are 
required to pass a new law, but in reality often only one debate is held. One concern 
specific to the Danish Parliament, which must be kept in mind, is the fact that work 
in parliament is highly controlled by the organization into political groupings and by 
a high degree of party discipline. This entails that the members have already taken 
their stance on a subject – and the decision of the party group to vote for or against a 
certain proposal will have been made – long before anyone enters into the public 
debate. And thus, the purpose of each speech will not be to persuade the other 
debaters to change their minds.  
 
3.1 The aim of parliamentary debate 
 
When making a normative analysis and critique of a rhetorical artifact, you 
obviously expect there to be an aim with the artifact you’re dealing with. I expected 
to be able to find sources describing the nature and purpose(s) of parliamentary 
debate, but my results were more than meager. I sadly concluded, that in Denmark it 
has hardly been analyzed, defined, clarified or debated what a parliamentary debate 
is or should be, neither from an ideal or a practical perspective. The only concrete 
result was the statement that the debates are paramount for our democracy and 
that they must always be accessible to the public. Why they are important or what 
the politicians, citizens or media are supposed to yield from them, was never 
examined. 
 Besides the function of official setting for the passing of laws, I did – through 
a historical approach – identify two important functions of the debates: 1) they must 
ensure that politicians can publicly stand by the agreements reached in backroom 
negotiations (I refer to this as the element of responsibility) and 2) the classical, 
deliberative aspect, namely setting forth arguments for and against the proposal (I 
refer to this as the element of content). My analysis showed with great clarity that it 
is very much the elements in the realm of responsibility that take up the majority of 
the space in the debates. Each debate of a law proposal becomes more of battle of 
general political points, attacks and image building, than an actual presentation of 
arguments for or against the proposal. If the debates are to be of use to the 
interested citizen in forming an opinion on the subject, this is a highly inexpedient 
prioritization of the elements, where pistis is concerned. 
 Through several readings of the material I became aware that the most 
interesting focal points from a pistis-perspective, would be where the debaters 
express doubt as to their own opinion of a proposal and also the points, where it 
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3.2 Debates containing elements of doubt 
 
The reason I found these debates especially interesting in relation to pistis, is the 
likeness of the situation of the speaker to that of the spectator or interested 
audience – the speaker puts forth (usually) reasonable and relevant questions to the 
proposal, which need to be answered, before it is decided how their party will vote 
on the matter. My analysis, however, uncovered two problems in correlation to this. 
Firstly, the speaker is often attacked or punished for expressing this doubt, usually 
in the form of accusations of stupidity, since the speaker could not immediately 
appreciate the wonders of the proposal. This is detrimental to pistis, because it 
undermines mutual respect and because the duty to acknowledge and address the 
arguments of the opponent is disregarded. Secondly, it caused me to reconsider 
whether the debates in their present form (or at least as they are at present 
executed) are suitable for handling the situations of doubt.  
 My answer would be that they are not, because the questions asked by the 
doubting speakers are seldom answered and hardly ever does the situation lead to 
an actual dialogue. This is a problem in terms of pistis, since the audience doesn’t get 
any answers to the questions either; we are lacking the explicit response to the 
arguments of the opponent. 
 
3.3 Debates containing elements of uncertainty 
 
As mentioned above, I found many points where it was uncertain whether it was 
real debate or merely attacks on the opponent. I got the feeling that politicians often 
came extremely close to conducting real, sober debates, but then tripping on the 
finish line, when giving it their final entertaining or even slick “twists” in order to 
discredit the opponent or to highlight themselves. And this of course makes for 
some very interesting points in the discussion of pistis, since any attack is a breach 
of pistis and even more so when they come in the disguise of real debate. 
 It became increasingly clear that the points, where I wasn’t sure whether real 
debate or attacks were taking place, had one common denominator: the intention to 
demonstrate a dissension of some kind in the opponent. This is a well-known move 
in argumentation and is often described as very potent in political debate. I 
identified four different types of accusations of dissension in the debates as shown 





Dissension of ideology Departing from the fundamental ideology of the 
speaker 
Dissension of practice Departing from what the speaker (or his or her 
party) “usually” stands for or defends 
Dissension of position Departing from former positions or actions on 
the same or similar subject matters 





I very much doubt the strength of this line of argumentation. Admitting to a change 
of position as a result of solid arguments may on the contrary, I believe, increase 
your credibility. My studies also showed that these accusations of dissension are 
very seldom answered either – the opponent simply never admits to the dissension, 
and furthermore dissension is often constructed on a straw man-version of the 
opponent’s arguments, ideology or current position. Except for “dissension of 
position”, which may be both relevant and legitimate, the accusations of dissension 
are overall negative, where pistis is concerned, partly because their numbers take up 
a disproportionate amount of time better spent on real debate and argumentation 
concerning the actual law proposal. And partly because they are highly detrimental 




My hypothesis was, firstly, that pistis, in the interpretation of Fafner, would be 
relevant as a norm for a normative, rhetorical criticism of parliamentary debates. 
And that it would hence be possible to define the norm in a manner to render it 
useful in a practical analysis. 
 Even from the scarce material I discovered certain functions of the 
parliamentary debates. They are a formal setting for the passing of laws, they ensure 
that politicians can publicly stand by the agreements reached in backroom 
negotiations (the element of responsibility) and provides an arena for setting forth 
arguments for and against the law proposals (the element of content). 
 Especially from what I refer to as the elements of responsibility and content, 
I argue that pistis is a relevant and expedient norm in the evaluation of 
parliamentary debate, since trust is of paramount importance, both among the 
politicians themselves and in their relationship with their voters, if the debates are 
to be of relevant use to the audience. 
 Inspired by other fields of study I have elaborated on the concept of pistis and 
it has emerged in the course of my work that pistis is in some ways akin to ethos; it 
can – as is the case with ethos – be established, but also deteriorate through 
rhetorical activity. And as ethos is composed of phronesis, arete and eunoia I have 
tentatively suggested a composition of pistis comprised of: “truth” (in the rhetorical 
sense of the word), “faith” (the expectation that everyone participates in the debate 
with the aim of reaching the best possible solutions for the common good) and 
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“respect” (an indispensable element, if general trust is to be maintained). 
 In my analysis I have focused on the more striking areas or points where 
pistis is compromised or otherwise dismantled. But I would like to conclude by 
urging that more comprehensive studies be made in the future, of the positive, 
constructive aspects of pistis, that I hope and believe will help us to develop a more 
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